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A Custodial Interrogation Subject’s Reliance on 
Traditional Language Customs when Facing 
Unknown Expectations for Legally Efficacious 
Speech 
Taylor J. Smith  
For various reasons, speakers often communicate indirectly, 
hiding their words’ true meaning beneath an apparent surface 
meaning. For example, a woman trying to brush off her  
co-worker’s date invitation might respond, “I have to prepare for 
a presentation tomorrow.” While the words’ surface meaning 
doesn’t relate to the date invitation, the hearer usually 
understands the underlying message—that is to say, the words’ 
function differs from their form. However, because the law’s 
language ideology requires directness and surface-level meaning, 
lay-speaking interrogation subjects often have difficulty 
effectively invoking their Miranda rights. Because the legal 
system’s search for determinacy often results in reliance on 
affirmative speech or actions, lay speakers often face significant 
disadvantages when held to the exacting expectations for legal 
speech because the law’s insistence on direct affirmative behavior 
contradicts natural and frequent linguistic behaviors, which 
implement indirectness. Warning lay speakers about exacting 
legal language requirements would allow these individuals to 
effectively communicate in a new language environment without 
improperly relying on societal conversation norms while still 
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As Marlon Jackson sat across from a Wichita detective, he 
listened as the detective read his Miranda rights aloud detailing 
that, as a suspect in a criminal investigation, he had the right to 
remain silent, that whatever he did say would and could be used 
against him in a court of law, that he had the right to an attorney, 
and that if he could not afford one then the court would appoint 
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one to him.1 Following each right, the detective asked Jackson if he 
understood.2 Each time he answered yes.3 The detective invited 
him to sign a form confirming his understanding and asked, 
“Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us?” 
Jackson responded: “Can I put no ‘til I get my lawyer?” 
Detective: “Well, that’s your decision to make.” 
Jackson: “But, I’m still going to have to talk to you all anyway, 
right?” 
Detective: “I’m sorry?” 
Jackson: “I’m still going to have to talk to you all about whatever?” 
Detective: “Well, you know, if you want to get a lawyer that’s 
fine, I don’t have a problem with that.” 
Jackson: “I have a lawyer already—” 
Detective: “Okay, and—” 
Jackson: “—but I have to get him before I can talk or—” 
Detective: “You don’t have to do that, that’s just—” 
Jackson responded, “I don’t have time for this . . . .” and he 
initialed the form. The detective continued, “Okay, go ahead and 
sign your name.” And Jackson did.4 
In another instance, as Richard LeRoy Mohr’s interrogation 
proceeded, the officers asked if they could record the 
interrogation.5 Mohr denied the request and said, “I want my 
lawyer. . . . [I]f you want this recorded, I want a lawyer present.”6 
The police did not record the interrogation that followed.7 
At a different sheriff’s office, Raymond Wilkinson heard his 
rights, as read from a written form, confirmed he understood, and 
refused to sign the form as a waiver of his rights.8 He asked if he 
could call his girlfriend, to which he was told no.9 Wilkinson then 
asked, “Could I call my lawyer?”10 Wilkinson was told yes.11 The 
 
 1. State v. Jackson, 19 P.3d 121, 124 (Kan. 2001). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 124–25. 
 5. United States v. Mohr, 772 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 6. Id. (alterations in original). 
 7. Id. at 1146. 
 8. Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:6 (2021) 
1678 
court opinion then indicates nothing else was said about the matter 
and the interrogation continued.12 
So, have these suspects invoked the right to counsel guaranteed 
by the Miranda warnings? Linguistic philosophy, and most casual 
observers, would say, unequivocally, yes. According to linguists, 
and a premise to which almost every native English speaker can 
attest, speakers often communicate with a speech form that differs 
from the intended function of the speech.13 For example, after 
receiving medical advice, a patient might object to the proposed 
treatment by saying, “I don’t know about that.” When asked if he 
hit his sister, a little boy might dodge the answer by saying, “She 
started it!” A restaurant patron might order a meal by saying, “Can 
I have the steak?” Each of these examples communicates an 
intended meaning that is different from the strict surface meaning 
of each word or form. Although the patient responds to the 
proposed treatment using words which, by their form, indicate a 
lack of knowledge, the patient, who may actually understand 
completely, is more likely trying to say, “That idea makes me 
uncomfortable.” Although the little boy actually makes an 
observation about the way he views the world, what he means to 
convey is, “It’s not my fault!” And although the restaurant patron 
orders the meat in the form of a question, the waiter understands 
perfectly that the patron was not inquiring about the theoretical 
possibility of the steak as an option for the meal.14 This type of 
utterance—in which the surface meaning and surface form differ 
from the primary intended communicative content and ultimate 
function of the language—is called an indirect speech act.15 And 
these indirect speech acts permeate daily life.16 
However, when Jackson, Mohr, and Wilkinson moved to 
suppress their statements, and in support, appealed the question  
of whether they had invoked their rights, each and every court  
said no.17 These courts relied on Supreme Court precedent in Davis 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police 
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 267–68 (1993) [hereinafter Ainsworth, Different Register]. 
 14. Note that, had the patron said something like “Is the steak still available?”, the 
waiter likely would have taken that as an inquiry as to whether the restaurant was still able 
to offer steak and not as an order for steak. 
 15. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13. 
 16. See id. 
 17. United States v. Mohr, 772 F.3d 1143, 1145–46 (8th Cir. 2014); Dormire, 249 F.3d at 
805; State v. Jackson, 19 P.3d 121, 125 (Kan. 2001). 
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v. United States,18 which held that “[m]aybe I should talk to a 
lawyer”19 did not qualify as an invocation of right requiring the 
“cessation of questioning” because the Court considered it a 
“reference to an attorney that [was] ambiguous or equivocal in  
that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have 
understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right  
to counsel.”20 
Linguistic and legal scholars have pointed out the contradiction 
between lay language and legal language that results in failed 
attempts to invoke rights during custodial interrogation.21 At least 
one scholar discussed the legal foundation of the Court’s opinions 
in Miranda v. Arizona and Edwards v. Arizona.22 Scholars have 
presented examples, and offered some analysis, of indirect speech 
acts in these contexts and explanations of the courts’ interpretation 
of them.23 Scholars have also argued that the legal standards for 
language interpretation in these contexts have been inappropriate 
mechanisms for truly understanding what a speaker actually 
means to communicate even when that meaning isn’t fully reflected 
in the words’ surface form, and have presented arguments which 
would broaden the courts’ indirect speech acceptance.24  
Previous scholars have identified and documented numerous 
examples of indirect speech in custodial interrogations and  
have engaged in some discussion regarding legal standards for  
their interpretation.25 This Note seeks to add to that discussion by 
 
 18. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
 19. See id. at 455, 459. This utterance was followed by a clarification by the officers and 
a subsequent confirmation from the interrogatee that he was “not asking for a lawyer.” 
However, the remainder of the case and subsequent case law has pulled this phrase out of 
its context as justification for interpreting similar phrases as equivocal or ambiguous and 
thus, inefficacious attempts by suspects to avail themselves of their rights. See, e.g., Mohr, 772 
F.3d at 1145–46; State v. Jennings, 647 N.W.2d 142, 151 (Wis. 2002); infra Part III. 
 20. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (emphasis in original). 
 21. Janet Ainsworth, ‘You Have the Right to Remain Silent . . .’ But Only If You Ask For It 
Just So: The Role of Linguistic Ideology in American Police Interrogation Law, 15 INT’L J. SPEECH, 
LANGUAGE & L. 1, 6–7 (2008) [hereinafter Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent]; Marianne 
Mason, Can I Get a Lawyer? A Suspect’s Use of Indirect Requests in a Custodial Setting, 20 INT’L 
J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE & L. 203, 217 (2013). 
 22. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 292–301. 
 23. See generally id.; Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra 
note 21. 
 24. See sources cited supra note 23. 
 25. See sources cited supra note 23. 
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(1) more clearly framing the phenomenon for legal scholarship;26 
(2) thoroughly describing the linguistic scholarship of previous 
authors and updating the discussion on the legal history 
surrounding custodial interrogations and the invocation of right;27 
(3) showing that the combination of indirect speech acts and 
asymmetries in conversational power dynamics, described by other 
authors, ultimately result in cross-cultural pragmatic failure;28 
(4) analyzing more deeply in-context examples of specific 
mechanisms for indirect speech in custodial interrogation;29 and, 
most significantly, (5) offering an alternative solution, couched in 
novel and legally founded justifications that recognize and 
reconcile the differing values between linguistic philosophy and 
the law.30 
In short, building off the work of other scholars, this Note 
explores the intersection where linguistic philosophies about 
standard human communication collide with American 
jurisprudence’s exacting speech expectations. Part I of this paper 
investigates the linguistic philosophies and behaviors underlying 
indirect speech acts and the resulting impact on societal norms and 
expectations for communication, as documented by linguists.31  
Part II reviews the standard language expectations of American 
jurisprudence and the precedent behind courts’ navigation of 
ambiguous and unambiguous invocation of right.32 Part III 
highlights the collision between these two philosophies and the 
resulting impact on lay suspects who find themselves in an exacting 
legal-language setting by reviewing the work of other scholars  
and conducting an independent analysis of particular instances.33  
Part IV proposes a unique solution to this difficult problem  
 
 26. The most thorough, contextualized, and analytic piece on this topic is Ainsworth’s 
article In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation. See 
Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13. However, the article focused on these 
characteristics as indicative of primarily female speech, only analyzed cases in terms of the 
courts’ standards (and not based on the mechanism of direct speech employed), and was 
written in 1993, one year before the Supreme Court decided the pivotal Davis case. See Davis 
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). Thus, additional discussion on the topic is justified, and 
a new recommendation for legal action is warranted. 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
 31. See infra Part I. 
 32. See infra Part II. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
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by suggesting an education mechanism that can help lay  
speakers bridge the gap between traditional conversational 
conventions and the law’s speech expectations.34 The legal  
system’s search for determinacy often results in reliance on 
affirmative speech or actions. Thus, lay speakers often face 
significant disadvantages when held to legal speech’s exacting 
expectations because the law’s insistence on direct affirmative 
behavior and language contradicts natural and frequent linguistic 
behaviors that implement indirectness. Providing a warning to lay 
speakers regarding the exacting requirements of legal language 
would allow these individuals to effectively communicate in a new 
language environment without relying on societal norms for 
conversation while still allowing the law to maintain affirmative 
language expectations. 
I. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY REGARDING PRAGMATIC MEANING AND 
INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS 
Judge Learned Hand said that “words are chameleons, which 
reflect the color of their environment.”35 In recognizing both 
semantic and pragmatic meaning, as shown by the writing of 
linguistic scholars, linguistic philosophy agrees. This Part reviews 
key linguistic principles including direct speech acts, indirect 
speech acts, how these types of acts pragmatically affect 
conversation, and what can happen when that pragmatic exchange 
fails during conversation. 
A. Direct Speech Acts 
Semantic, or literal, language meaning can exist on a word or 
phrasal level, but in both cases it represents the facial meaning of 
the word or phrase as contained in the word or phrase’s direct 
definition and direct form.36 One example of a semantically based 
phrase is the direct performative speech act.37 “Performative 
utterances are speech acts that, by being uttered, accomplish the 
 
 34. See infra Part IV. 
 35. Comm’r v. Nat’l Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1948); see also Yates v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083 (2015) (Justice Ginsburg citing Judge Learned Hand). 
 36. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 479, 487 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, 
Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1631 (2017) [hereinafter 
Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning]. 
 37. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 265 n.18. 
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state of affairs to which they refer,”38 and “[d]irect performatives 
are those in which the speaker utters a performative utterance and 
‘means exactly and literally what he says.’”39 Direct speech acts 
convey a message concisely and directly because the very words 
spoken contain both the form and meaning on the surface.40 Direct 
speech acts can often be identified by inserting an “adverbial 
‘hereby’” that emphasizes what act the language is performing.41 
For example, a medical patient might directly object to a 
proposed treatment by saying, “I [hereby] reject your offer for 
medical services and [hereby] retain my consent for performing the 
services.” A restaurant patron might directly order a meal by 
stating, “I [hereby] choose and [hereby] request the steak as the 
order for my meal.” The interrogation subject could say, “I [hereby] 
invoke my right to a lawyer and [hereby] invoke my right to remain 
silent, and I [hereby] declare that I will not speak with you until I 
have a lawyer with me.” In each of the direct speech acts, the words 
in themselves conveyed the message and performed the act the 
speaker desired to perform by using language.42 Further, the direct 
speech was able to convey these messages independent of the 
conversational context of the speakers.43 “Law abounds with 
instances in which performative utterances create legally 
significant consequences,” including “offering and accepting in 
contractual relations, bequeathing property in a will, and reciting 
marriage vows.”44 When an utterance—an isolated instance of 
verbal speech—is a direct speech act, analyzing meaning is simple 
because both the message and the result are self-contained within 
the form and the semantic meaning of words used in the 
utterance.45 But, while direct phrases may be commonly expected 
in settings with legal consequences, they are observably not a 
primary means of communication in lay settings.  
 
 38. Id. at 265. 
 39. Id. at 265 n.18 (quoting John R. Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE 171, 171 (A.P. Martinich ed., 1985)). 
 40. Id. at 265. 
 41. Id. at 266. 
 42. Whether the speech act ultimately obtains the desired result of its declared 
performance will sometimes depend on the hearer. For example, the restaurant patron by so 
speaking performs the act of choosing the steak, but whether the choice results in a steak 
being brought will, of course, depend on the hearer. 
 43. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 265–66. 
 44. Id. at 266. 
 45. See id. at 265. 
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B. Indirect Speech Acts 
Often “[t]he full communicative content of [an utterance] is not 
reducible to its literal meaning . . . because of the role that context 
plays in clarifying and enriching the communicative content 
conveyed by [the utterance].”46 “In the philosophy of language 
and . . . linguistics, the role of context” and social factors that 
influence the meaning of an utterance is known as “pragmatics” or 
pragmatic meaning.47 Reliance on contextual and social factors 
allows speakers to communicate without embedding a strict and 
direct meaning in every utterance.48 In other words, by relying on 
pragmatic meaning, speakers can communicate indirectly.49  
Indirect speech acts are those utterances in which the surface 
meaning and surface form differ from the primary intended 
communicative content and ultimate function of the language.50 
Generally, these speech acts do two things, one which is 
represented by the surface form, and a second, more primary 
purpose, which is represented by the underlying intention as 
derived from the context of the situation.51 These phrases contain 
two important but distinct features: form and function.52 For 
example, while the question “‘Can you pass the salt?’ . . . is literally 
a question about the addressee’s physical abilities, most would take 
it as a request to pass the salt. . . . Since the request is indirectly 
performed through the direct question, this utterance is an indirect 
speech act.”53 Because the primary purpose of the speech act is to 
obtain the desired underlying goal rather than a direct response to 
the surface form of the utterance, the indirect communication 
imbedded in the utterance—the indirect speech act—”is more 
important than the direct one.”54 Function over form. 
The process of negotiating the understanding of indirect 
meaning through context and social factors occurs through 
 
 46. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 36, at 1632. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1634. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Mary Kate McGowan, Shan Shan Tam & Margaret Hall, On Indirect Speech Acts and 
Linguistic Communication: A Response to Bertolet, 84 PHIL. 495, 496 (2009). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. Note that at least one linguist, Bertolet, rejects traditional notions of indirect 
speech act theory. See generally id. 
 54. Id. at 496. 
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“conversational implicature, the reading into spoken discourse of a 
meaning beyond the literal meaning of the words used in the 
utterance.”55 While “speakers and hearers alike are seldom 
consciously aware of having made the leaps of meaning that 
conversational implicature entails[,]” it “enables listeners to 
interpret indirect language when the literal meaning of the words 
used would otherwise make little sense in the social context of their 
utterance.”56 The context of the utterance creates motivation for the 
speaker; through that context, the hearer can intuit the speaker’s 
primary purpose in speaking.57 
While direct speech act analysis is simple, if the utterance is 
indirect—often indicated by a surface form or meaning, different 
from its function, that does not indicate a desire or appear to be a 
meaningful response to the speaker—then the analysis must 
include a review of the surrounding context in order to properly 
unpack the intended meaning.58 And, in everyday conversation, the 
determination of this function is conducted through a negotiation 
between the speakers in which the intended communicative 
content is revealed through context and throughout the interaction. 
Where a person is, what a person is doing, and to whom a person 
is speaking will all indicate the proper lens through which to 
interpret the utterances in a given language exchange.59 Pragmatic 
meaning and indirect speech acts are culturally pervasive and thus 
create conversational norms, or scripts, on which people rely.60  
C. Conversational Application of Pragmatics and Speech Acts 
Judge Easterbrook recognized that “[y]ou don’t have to be 
Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that 
successful communication depends on meanings shared by 
 
 55. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 268. 
 56. Id. at 268–69. 
 57. See id. at 268 nn.23 & 25 (citing Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE 
WAY OF WORDS 22, 26–27 (1989)) (“Grice breaks down this metarule of conversational 
implicature into a set of more specific maxims: (1) Maxim of Quantity: Be as informative as 
the situation requires, but not more informative than is required; (2) Maxim of Quality: Do 
not say things that you believe to be false or for which you lack adequate evidence; (3) Maxim 
of Relation: Be relevant; (4) Maxim of Manner. Be direct, unambiguous, and brief.”). 
 58. See McGowan et al., supra note 50, at 496–97. 
 59. See generally id. 
 60. See generally id. (suggesting that some indirect speech acts are such cemented 
scripts that they always represent the indirect meaning). 
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interpretive communities.”61 This includes meanings implied in 
indirect speech. In everyday conversation, the ability to interpret 
indirect speech acts and to intuit pragmatic meaning is predicated 
on the mutual cooperation of the speakers.62 Janet Ainsworth, a 
prominent linguist and a professor of law at Seattle University 
School of Law, suggested that 
the accepted norms of expression in any given speech community 
determine the application of the rules of conversational 
implicature. . . . [I]n many social contexts, conversational 
implicature permits speakers to use extremely indirect statements 
to accomplish their communicative goals. Successful 
communication, however, depends on the listener sharing the 
speaker’s expectations as to the degree of indirectness.63  
But, because indirect speech acts are so ingrained into regular 
societal communication, speakers often rely on their use in order to 
convey meaning.64 In this act, speakers presume their conversation 
partner will be cooperative.65 
Beyond customary reliance on indirect speech scripts, scholars 
have shown that speakers often adapt their language to reflect the 
environment they are in, the people they are with, and the situation 
in which they find themselves.66 For example, in order to be polite, 
respectful, or unimposing, a speaker will alter their speech.67 When 
speakers recognize an authority-based power disparity between 
themselves and their speech partner they often use indirect 
language in order to gain favor by appearing more polite and 
submissive.68 Scholars have documented that these attempts to be 
polite often take different forms. These forms include 
conditionalization, in which a speaker predicates language on a 
certain contingency with the use of if/then statements; hedging, in 
which a speaker softens the language with words such as “should,” 
“could,” or “I think . . .”; or reformation, such as when a speaker 
 
 61. Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 62. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 268–69. 
 63. Id. at 270. 
 64. See id. at 268–71. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Harold Anthony Lloyd, Law’s Way of Words: Pragmatics and Textualist Error,  
49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 221, 254–64 (2016). 
 67. Mason, supra note 21, at 217. 
 68. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 6–7. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:6 (2021) 
1686 
presents the request in question form,69 changes intonation, 70 or 
uses tag questions.71 Linguists have suggested that often, the more 
indirect the language, the more polite the language is meant to be.72 
“These are qualities speakers have been socialized to believe may 
assist them in [reputation-]threatening contexts.”73 The disparities 
resulting from variance in authority between conversation 
participants are known as power dynamics, or power asymmetry.74 
Research shows that the greater the perceived disparity in status 
between conversation participants, the greater the likelihood that 
the less powerful participant will seek to communicate their intent 
or meanings through indirect means.75 These documented 
mechanisms for politeness, whether seeking help indirectly 
through a question, or through an up-tone in intonation, can be, to 
use Ainsworth’s description, “fatal”76 when the hearer is expecting 
the speaker to be direct.77 
D. Cross-Cultural Pragmatic Failure 
This reliance on cooperative conversation and the assumed 
understanding of indirect speech acts is not fool-proof.78 Pragmatic 
failure occurs when one conversation participant misunderstands, 
or entirely misses the intended meaning of another speaker.79  
In other words, pragmatic failure occurs when one participant is 
unable “to understand ‘what is meant by what is said.’”80 In the best 
of situations, pragmatic failure results in a re-negotiation between 
the speakers in order to establish mutual understanding regarding 
the communication.81 In the worst of situations, pragmatic failure 
 
 69. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to 
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21. 
 70. ALAN CRUTTENDEN, GIMSON’S PRONUNCIATION OF ENGLISH 335 (8th ed. 2014). 
 71. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to 
Remain Silent, supra note 21. 
 72. See Mason, supra note 21, at 217. 
 73. Id. at 219. 
 74. See Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 6–7. 
 75. Id. at 7. 
 76. Id. at 9. 
 77. See infra Part III. 
 78. See generally Jenny Thomas, Cross-Cultural Pragmatic Failure, 4 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 
91 (1983). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 269–71. 
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results in each speaker entirely missing the other speaker’s point, 
or assuming that the speech partner is rude, unintelligent, 
stubborn, or uncooperative.82  
The potential for pragmatic failure is significantly increased 
when conversation partners do not share the same speech culture.83 
The communication breakdown that occurs when there is 
“communication between two people who, in any particular 
domain, do not share a common linguistic or cultural background” 
is known as “cross-cultural pragmatic failure.”84 This distinction is 
not limited to speakers of different languages or from different 
countries but “might include workers and management, members 
of ethnic minorities and the police, or (when the domain of 
discourse is academic writing) university lecturers and new 
undergraduate students.”85 Cross-cultural pragmatic failure results 
from an inability of one or both participants to properly appreciate 
the situational context as perceived by their conversation partner, 
and thus the hearer can misunderstand the speaker’s intended 
meaning. Because assumptions and expectations about language 
use are not shared, meaning-negotiation breaks down.86 
Different language cultures (or ideologies) result in differing 
speech-scripts (or common speech patterns), assumptions about 
language, and expectations about language use. These ideologies 
have been defined as “‘shared bodies of commonsense notions 
about the nature of language in the world,’ or . . . ‘the ideas with 
 
 82. See Thomas, supra note 78, at 101–02. Thomas shares an example of potential cross-
cultural pragmatic failure in which a form of “yes” in Russian, most similar to English “of 
course” doesn’t always translate with the appropriate meaning in English: 
A  Are you coming to my party? 
B  Of course. [Gloss: Yes, indeed/it goes without saying/I wouldn’t miss it for 
the world!] 
Id. at 102. However, as she points out, “of course” is used in English to answer questions 
whose answer is already self-evident. Thus, if used to answer a “‘genuine’ question” 
the response “can sound at best peremptory and at worst insulting.” Id. For example: 
A  Is it a good restaurant? 
B  Of course. [Gloss (for Russian S): Yes, (indeed) it is. (For English H): What a 
stupid question!] 
A  Is it open on Sundays? 
B  Of course. [Gloss (for Russian S): Yes, (indeed) it is. (For English H): Only an 
idiotic foreigner would ask!)] 
Id. 
 83. Id. at 91–92. 
 84. Id. at 91. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See generally id. 
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which participants and observers frame their understanding of 
linguistic varieties and map those understandings onto people, 
events, and activities that are significant to them.’”87 For example, 
the “polyglotism of . . . Aboriginal Australia . . . gives rise to one set 
of ideologies. The insistent . . . legislated monoglot standard of . . . 
the U.S. judicial system . . . spawns a very different set of 
ideological principles about what counts as ‘language’ in the first 
place . . . .”88 Indeed, terms such as “legalese,” and book chapter 
titles such as The Language of Lawyers and the Language of Plumbers 
indicate a widely recognized distinction between the language 
culture of lay society and that of the law.89 These observable 
distinctions between lay language and legal language ought to raise 
serious questions about the justifiability of holding a lay speaker, 
with a lay-language culture, to the often exacting standards of the 
legal-language culture. 
The speech phenomena documented by Ainsworth and other 
scholars90 mirror this same pattern in which the conversation 
participants—the suspects, and the investigators—do not share 
mutual language expectations. The inability of custodial 
interrogation subjects to invoke their rights is caused by  
cross-cultural differences in the pragmatic use of language—that of 
a lay speaker on one hand, and that of one expecting legally specific 
and determinative language on the other—and thus these 
interactions are a representation of cross-cultural pragmatic failure.  
II. LEGAL PRECEDENT SURROUNDING LANGUAGE-IDEOLOGY AND 
 
 87. John B. Haviland, Ideologies of Language: Some Reflections on Language and U.S. Law, 
105 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 764, 764 (2003) (citations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 765. 
 89. Edward Finegan, The Language of Lawyers and the Language of Plumbers, in SPEAKING 
OF LANGUAGE AND LAW: CONVERSATIONS ON THE WORK OF PETER TIERSMA 56 (Lawrence M. 
Solan et al. eds., 2015). This disparity has caused at least one linguist to conceptualize the 
law’s language ideology in this way: 
  People have an obligation to use language transparently and bear the 
responsibility if they fail to use language precisely and appropriately. . . . 
Therefore, it is fair to hold people to the objective meaning entailed by the 
language that they use, irrespective of what they subjectively intended that 
language to mean. 
Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 15–16. 
 90. See, e.g., Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to 
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21. 
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CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 
Any law student struggling through the refiner’s fire of a first-
year legal writing class can confirm that the law’s expectation for 
language clarity differs from other speech arenas. Because the law 
consistently relies on the notion of “ordinary meaning,” and other 
principles of surface clarity in language,91 the law’s language 
ideology also holds individuals to an exacting communication 
standard. Thus, if a person’s intent is not apparent in the “ordinary 
meaning” of the text, then the person risks a court overwriting that 
intent with what it judges to be the objectively ordinary meaning of 
what the person said or wrote.92 In this sense, in multiple legal 
arenas, courts have rejected the idea of underlying communicative 
intent in favor of relying on the language’s surface meaning.93 This 
Part reviews legal language ideology, the legal standards regarding 
custodial interrogation and Miranda warnings, and some courts’ 
meager attempts to reconcile legal speech with lay speech. 
A. Legal Linguistic-Ideology 
One linguist has suggested that “[w]hen comparing the 
observed directives [used in the language of the law] to directives 
observed in everyday conversations, . . . . [l]egislative texts and 
simple contracts of English Contract Law show a predominance of 
direct strategies . . . whereas conversational English favours 
conventionally indirect strategies.”94 The law displays its 
expectations for clarity, and correspondingly requisite patterns in 
legal language interpretation, in many branches of the legal 
profession.95 
 
 91. See infra Section II.A. 
 92. Infra Section II.A; infra Part III. 
 93. Infra Section II.A; infra Part III. 
 94. Anna Trosborg, Statutes and Contracts: An Analysis of Legal Speech Acts in the English 
Language of the Law, 23 J. PRAGMATICS 31, 52 (1995). 
 95. For example, criminal law also contains clarity expectations. Criminal issues of 
rape have often hinged on the issue of consent. In the past the standard for consent was based 
on a “no-means-no” philosophy, in which, in order to demonstrate that she had been raped, 
a woman had to show that she had either given sufficient verbal or sufficient physical 
resistance to show that she did not consent. As this area of law has evolved, the burden has 
shifted towards a “yes-means-yes” standard in which the defendant bears the burden of 
showing that the victim did consent to the encounter. Both of these standards assume that 
the law can clearly identify intent through the surface meaning of language and body 
language. While it goes beyond the scope of this Note to argue one way or the other, the vast 
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One overarching feature of the courts’ interpretation of 
language is a reluctance to investigate the context or underlying 
intent of a text or utterance. This general standard applies across 
multiple legal forums including statutory interpretation, contract 
law, and tort law. In terms of statutory interpretation, the Supreme 
Court has adopted the “plain meaning rule,” stating that “where 
the language . . . is clear[,] . . . the words employed are to be taken 
as the final expression of the meaning intended”—the analysis ends 
there.96 While it would be a misrepresentation to ignore the 
numerous canons judges use to interpret discerned ambiguities in 
statutes, oral speech, arguably, does not receive the same 
interpretive treatment. While judges vary in the extent to which 
they will look beyond the text and into underlying context such as 
legislative intent, Justice Kagan on the Supreme Court made it clear 
that judges all start with the text when she said, “We’re all 
textualists now.”97 In contract law the expectation is that the parties 
manifest their intent in the language of the contract.98 “In so far as 
their intention is an influential element, it is only such intention as 
the words or acts of the parties indicate; not one secretly cherished 
which is inconsistent with those words or acts.”99 In tort law, when 
a party’s representations regarding consent are in question, at least 
one court has held that “whatever [the] unexpressed feelings may 
have been[,] [i]n determining whether [there was] consent[] [the 
hearer] could be guided only by . . . overt acts and [overt] 
manifestations of . . . feelings.”100  
 
number of cases dealing with consent should be sufficient to demonstrate a gap between 
legal language expectations and that language standard enacted by the parties involved. See, 
e.g., Nicholas J. Little, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results of an 
Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1321 (2005). 
 96. United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); see also Thomas R. 
Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L. J. 788 (2018). Without 
agreeing or supporting a thesis that suggests that the plain meaning standard is a justified 
standard, Lee and Mouritsen show that the standard exists and that others have justified it 
on grounds of reliability, determinacy, and the rule of law. Lee & Mouritsen, supra. 
 97. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 96, at 793 nn.10–11 (citing Elena Kagan, The Scalia 
Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, HARV. L. TODAY (Nov. 17, 
2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation 
[http://perma.cc/3BCF-FEFR]). 
 98. Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1907) (cited in Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21). 
 99. Id. 
 100. O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891). 
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In each of these different (but individually nuanced) legal 
forums, the same pattern prevails—surface meaning over 
contextual meaning. This language ideology, expecting meaning  
to reside primarily at the surface level, has also manifested  
itself in the standards required to invoke relevant rights during 
custodial interrogation. 
B. Legal Standards Regarding Communication in 
Custodial Interrogation 
The law has established a robust set of procedural expectations 
surrounding custodial interrogations.101 These procedures have 
been instituted as a prophylactic protection against the violation of 
a suspect’s constitutional rights.102 The Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination and right to counsel103 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process of law104 all set constitutional 
standards regarding the process of dealing with a suspect of a 
criminal offense. The well-known and seminal case regarding 
application of constitutional rights during custodial interrogation 
is Miranda v. Arizona.105 The Supreme Court made the procedural 
standard for protecting a suspect’s constitutional rights very clear, 
stating that 
the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By 
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless 
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons 
of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to 
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any 
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an 
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive 
 
 101. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 102. Id. at 463. 
 103. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 105. See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. 
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effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates 
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to 
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no 
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in 
any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police 
may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered 
some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does 
not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further 
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter 
consents to be questioned.106 
Thereby, the Court created what has commonly become known 
as the Miranda warning.107 The Court admitted that these 
procedural rights extended beyond the boundaries of the 
Constitution but suggested that the nature of interrogation justified 
the overprotection of the constitutional rights, and throughout the 
opinion, the Court justified each explicit procedural requirement. 
In Dickerson v. United States, the Court reaffirmed its decision in 
Miranda, declared that the decision setting procedural 
requirements as a prophylactic protection of constitutional right 
was, in fact, a constitutional decision that could not be “overruled 
by an Act of Congress,” and held that Miranda and the related cases 
continued to “govern the admissibility of statements made during 
custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.”108 While 
scholars debate whether the protections were legitimately 
constitutional or auxiliary and overbearing, the Supreme Court’s 
standard remains.109 
Since that time, the Court’s broad statement that indication in 
“any manner” of a desire to invoke the right required a cessation of 
the interrogation has been significantly narrowed.110 But the essential 
rights guaranteed by Miranda still stand. 
 
 106. Id. at 444–45. 
 107. A traditional representation of the Miranda warnings is as follows: 
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against 
you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an 
attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you understand the rights I have just 
read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me? 
Miranda Warning, MIRANDAWARNING.ORG, http://www.mirandawarning.org/mirandawarning.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2021). 
 108. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). 
 109. Id. at 444 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 110. See generally Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
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1. Invoking the Miranda rights 
In Edwards v. Arizona, the Court again faced the question of 
whether statements made during a custodial interrogation were 
admissible in court following an attempted invocation of the 
Miranda rights.111 The interrogation subject in this case was initially 
successful in invoking his right to counsel when he said, “I want an 
attorney before making a deal.”112 While the questioning ceased at 
that time, a different officer came later, told him he “had to” talk, 
and continued the interrogation in which the subject eventually 
confessed to his involvement in the crime.113 The Court held that 
the interrogation subject’s rights had been violated and specified 
“that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to 
deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”114 
But still, what does it mean to express a desire to deal with the 
police only through counsel? 
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court clarified the 
standards established by Miranda and Edwards and “decide[d] how 
law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect makes a 
reference to counsel that is insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards 
prohibition on further questioning.”115 At the outset of his 
interview, the suspect in Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer.”116 The interrogating officers sought to clarify the 
statement.117 The suspect indicated that he was not yet requesting  
a lawyer.118 The interrogation continued until the suspect said,  
“I think I want a lawyer,” at which point investigators terminated 
 
 111. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 112. Id. at 479. Note that this is likely an indirect request for an attorney which the Court 
recognized as such. Why this indirect statement is sufficient and other similar statements are 
not sufficient to invoke rights is a question for future scholarship. This Note circumvents that 
bridge by eventually proposing a solution which would eliminate the potential for these 
types of inconsistencies or minute distinctions. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 484–85. 
 115. Davis, 512 U.S. at 454. 
 116. Id. at 455. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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the interview.119 The Court took this opportunity to clarify the 
threshold at which a suspect attains the protections guaranteed  
by Edwards.120 
The Court acknowledged that before Edwards can effectively be 
applied, there must be an initial determination of whether rights 
were ever invoked.121 Seeming to ignore the language in Miranda 
that an invocation can occur in “any manner,”122 the Court stated: 
Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel “requires, at a 
minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be 
an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” But if 
a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or 
equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances 
would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking 
the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation 
of questioning. . . . Rather, the suspect must unambiguously 
request counsel. . . . “[A] statement either is such an assertion of 
the right to counsel or it is not.”123  
In essence, the Court defined these rights as passive rights, 
which cannot be surpassed until waived, and which cannot come 
to fruition until invoked.124 In an attempt to clarify their language 
 
 119. Id. Note that interrogators decided to terminate the interview. The Court did not 
rule whether this subsequent attempt to invoke right was ambiguous or not. Further, this 
Note does not analyze whether the Court’s determination regarding the language was 
appropriate in this instance, but only argues that without additional steps to ensure the 
linguistic capability of interrogation suspects that the standard established by the Supreme 
Court is unworkable in terms of protecting a suspect’s constitutional rights. It should also be 
noted that throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court isolated the phrase “Maybe I should 
talk to a lawyer” in such a way as to appear as if the phrase itself was insufficient language 
to result in an invocation of right notwithstanding the surrounding context. Regardless of 
whether this was the Court’s intent, courts and government entities have used this argument 
as a way to suggest that similar phrases, independent of context, were insufficient to invoke 
rights. See, e.g., United States v. Vanwaart, No. 17-CR-4063-LTS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72062, 
at *9 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 10, 2018); Matthews v. McKee, No. 06-CV-15253, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4454, at *23 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2009). 
 120. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 454. The Court also discussed the different standards applied 
by other courts including (1) that any request for a lawyer required cessation of the 
interrogation, (2) that some courts required a certain threshold before an invocation of right 
was deemed clear, and (3) that upon mention of a lawyer, interrogators were required to ask 
clarifying questions to determine the subject’s intentions. Id. at 456. 
 121. Id. at 458. 
 122. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 123. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (citations omitted). 
 124. See id. at 458–60. It seems to be a strange right which cannot be ignored by the one 
who would violate it, and yet is not immediately available to the holder until it is 
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clarity standards, the Court specified that “a suspect need not 
‘speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don,’” but “must 
articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that 
a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand 
the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement  
fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require 
that the officers stop questioning . . . .”125 Since Davis, courts have 
been undecided about what “clear” and “unambiguous” mean.126 
As linguists have pointed out, the meaning of “plain meaning” is 
ambiguous, and so is the meaning of “ambiguity.”127 Ambiguity is 
in the eye of the beholder.128 Courts attempting to follow the 
Supreme Court’s instruction from Davis have proven that.129 
For example, in United States v. Mohr, the person in custody 
said, “I want my lawyer. . . . [I]f you want this recorded, I want a 
lawyer present.”130 The court heightened the standard expected by 
Davis and agreed with the district court, which held that “this 
request was conditioned on whether the interview was recorded, 
and that since the interview was not recorded, Mohr’s condition for 
requiring counsel was not met.”131 Requests for an attorney need 
not only be clear but also unconditional.132  
In Marr v. State, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held 
that the Miranda rights can only be claimed after the suspect is in a 
custodial setting, and because the defendant in that instance had 
sought to invoke his rights after he was arrested but before he was 
actually in an interrogational setting, the invocation was invalid.133 
 
unequivocally claimed and enacted. Note also that this same standard is applied to the other 
rights affirmed by the Miranda warnings. 
 125. Id. at 459. 
 126. See infra Part III. 
 127. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 96, at 793 nn.10–11, 797 n.28 (citing ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 299 (2012)); 
id. at 798 n.31 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 792–93 (4th ed. 2007)). 
 128. See id. at 797 n.28. 
 129. See infra Part III. 
 130. United States v. Mohr, 772 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 131. Id. at 1146. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Marr v. State, 759 A.2d 327, 338 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (dicta reaffirming that 
the Miranda rights can only be invoked in context of a custodial interrogation). However,  
it’s difficult to see how this difference is very significant to a person who has been arrested—
likely a person in this scenario does not make a distinction between the arrest and the actual 
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A quick Lexis search shows courts of appeals are rife with questions 
about whether an alleged invocation of right was clear. When it 
comes to invoking a Miranda right, what is “clear” is 
remarkably unclear.134 
2. Waiving the Miranda rights 
The Court has set a standard, albeit an ironically ambiguous 
one, regarding how to invoke the Miranda rights, and case law also 
governs the standards regarding effective waiver of those rights. 
Waiver has been elicited through speech and through signing 
forms signifying an assent to talk with the police notwithstanding 
the understood Miranda warning.135  
North Carolina v. Butler contains the overarching standard 
regarding whether a suspect has effectively waived the Miranda 
rights. In Butler, the interrogation subject was informed of his rights 
but refused to sign a form waiving them. “He was told that he need 
neither speak nor sign the form, but that the agents would like him 
to talk to them. The respondent replied: ‘I will talk to you but I am 
not signing any form.’”136 The Court considered this a waiver of 
right and stated that 
an express statement can constitute a waiver, and that silence 
alone after such warnings cannot do so. But . . . an express 
statement is [not] indispensable to a finding of waiver. An express 
written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or 
of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that 
waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to 
establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather 
whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived 
the rights delineated in the Miranda case. . . . [M]ere silence is not 
enough. That does not mean that the defendant’s silence, coupled 
with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct 
indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that a 
defendant has waived his rights. . . . [I]n at least some cases 
waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the 
 
interrogation. Rather, throughout the process, the suspect is beholden to the police the entire 
time, so it is reasonable, especially considering the exposure to the rights through popular 
media, that they might expect the rights to apply as soon as they are arrested. 
 134. See infra Part III. 
 135. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375–76 (1979); State v. Jackson, 19 
P.3d 121, 124–25 (Kan. 2001). 
 136. Butler, 441 U.S. at 371. 
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person interrogated[;] . . . an explicit statement of waiver is not 
invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant 
waived the right to remain silent or the right to counsel . . . .137 
The idea that suspects can waive their rights through implied 
waiver—a course of conduct indicating waiver—has been well 
heeded by courts.138 In United States v. Acosta, the suspect explicitly 
refused to waive his rights but agreed to talk.139 The court noted the 
instruction from Butler, that a refusal to waive rights is not an 
invocation, and, based upon the suspect’s cooperation in speaking, 
ruled that the suspect had waived his rights sufficiently to disable 
his subsequent motion to suppress based on the premise that he 
had explicitly refused to waive his rights.140 This creates a 
dichotomy in which it is linguistically difficult to invoke rights, yet 
behaviorally simple to waive the same rights.141  
Miranda held that rights can be invoked post waiver.142 And 
Edwards confirms that there can be waiver post invocation but that 
the standard is higher: “[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to 
have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver 
of that right cannot be established by showing only that he 
responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if 
he has been advised of his rights.”143 Even so, these standards 
generally go back to the initial question of what invocation of right 
actually is.  
 
 137. Id. at 373–76. 
 138. See Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 12–14 (describing a number 
of cases where the courts found implied waiver of rights). 
 139. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1143–44, 1152–55 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 140. Id. at 1154. 
 141. Compare O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891), in which the 
plaintiff alleged she had been vaccinated against her will. The court record suggested she 
said she had already received a vaccination but held out her arm to the inoculating doctor 
anyways. Id. The court held that they could not rely on unexpressed feelings but could only 
operate from her affirmative behaviors, and thus she had consented to the vaccination by the 
act of holding out her arm. Id. Whether holding the arm out actually indicated intent to be 
vaccinated could be, of course, the hotly debated subject of any given torts class. See also 
Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21. 
 142. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966). 
 143. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). 
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C. The Court’s Warranty 
The Court acknowledged that this standard would put some 
linguistically unsophisticated individuals at a disadvantage, 
stating that 
requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might 
disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear, intimidation, 
lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will not 
clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually 
want to have a lawyer present. But the primary protection 
afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda 
warnings themselves. “[F]ull comprehension of the rights to 
remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel 
whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.”144  
This statement is either a warranty that the Court does not view 
the Miranda warnings as important enough to ensure accessibility 
through generally accessible language use, or it contains a 
significant misassumption about language: that understanding the 
warning will be sufficient to indicate to listeners the language 
required in order to avail themselves of the protection of the rights.  
In either case, the Miranda warnings fail to fulfill their  
purpose of legitimately protecting constitutional rights. The  
Court suggested that the linguistic ability of an “Oxford don” 
would not be necessary to invoke the right.145 Janet Ainsworth 
argues that not even an Oxford don could efficaciously invoke his 
rights.146 And if that Oxford don was operating under the most 
common assumptions about communication in English—in other 
words, under a lay-language ideology—Ainsworth would 
certainly be right. 
III. THE COMMUNICATIVE CHASM BETWEEN SUSPECT AND 
INTERROGATOR IN CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 
Succinctly put, lay language has an indirect language ideology 
and culture, and legal language has a direct language ideology and 
 
 144. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 
412, 427 (1986)). 
 145. Id. at 459. 
 146. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 19. 
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culture.147 Although the legal profession embraces indirect speech 
acts in certain arenas,148 in other arenas—such as custodial 
interrogation—the law is not such a cooperative speech partner.149 
Rather, the law has, in essence, established its own linguistic 
culture, in which language is often viewed with precision, and the 
idea of interpreting subjective context is considered an unreliable 
means of creating the rule of law.150 This results in a legal standard 
for language that requires language that is direct, affirmative,  
and unequivocal.151  
Linguistic scholars have documented that this difference 
between lay and legal language is significant because the indirect 
scripts relied upon in a lay setting cannot be relied upon in a legal 
setting in order to effectively communicate intent.152 This Note 
builds from those observations, suggesting that when language is 
the critical element dictating the potential consequences of a high-
stakes interaction, such as an interrogation, this difference in 
language ideology and culture—between societal conversational 
norms predicated on indirect speech acts and the law’s expectation 
for precision or directness—creates a chasm that must be bridged 
in order to avoid an injustice-inducing, cross-cultural pragmatic 
failure. In custodial interrogation, this cross-cultural pragmatic gap 
has not yet been bridged.  
Although, ideologically speaking, lay individuals come from a 
different linguistic culture from that in which the law operates, the 
law still holds individuals to its expectations for direct language 
use.153 Because lay people come from a different linguistic culture 
than the law’s, Ainsworth documents that they often lack the 
knowledge of legal scripts necessary to employ appropriately 
 
 147. See Trosborg, supra note 94, at 52. Further, this present Note is not discussing the 
arguable double standard regarding the courts’ rejection of implied invocation of right and 
acceptance of implied waiver or the double standard regarding the courts’ expectation for 
express invocation of right but rejection of express non-waiver. 
 148. Consider, for example, the use of a casebook to teach a principle of law instead of 
teaching the principle upfront, or the use of a Socratic teaching method as a way to indirectly 
help a law student reach a particular conclusion. 
 149. See infra Part III. 
 150. See Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 14–19; Haviland, supra note 87. 
 151. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 152. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13; Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, 
supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21. 
 153. See supra Section II.A; see infra Section III.C. 
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affirmative, direct, unequivocal, or efficacious language.154 This 
results in an uneven playing field in which one conversant has 
power and knowledge, and the other has neither the power nor 
knowledge needed to successfully navigate the linguistic 
environment that is thrust upon them.155  
Even since Davis, litigation abounds regarding whether a 
suspect has clearly invoked these rights.156 Why? Because the 
Supreme Court’s standard is not based on the linguistic reality of 
indirect lay speech. Recognizing indirect lay-speech behaviors 
reveals that interrogation subjects frequently use indirect speech 
acts as a means to invoke or to attempt to invoke these rights.157 In 
an unfamiliar or uncomfortable environment supervised by 
significant authority figures,158 a layperson’s language culture 
would naturally lean toward conveying otherwise direct desires  
by communicating through indirect speech acts such as 
conditionalizing, hedging, and reformation.159 
Linguistic scholars have documented suspects’ use of indirect 
speech during custodial interrogations and have discovered a 
variety of indirect speech mechanisms employed by suspects in 
their attempts to invoke their rights.160 Scholars have also identified 
the linguistic underpinnings of indirect speech and the obvious 
contradiction with strict language standards of the law161 and have 
presented a number of examples showing both the indirect speech 
of custodial interrogation subjects and the courts’ response to their 
language.162 While some authors have presented specific 
 
 154. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 2. 
 155. See generally id. 
 156. See infra Section III.C. 
 157. Id. Further, if the confession is used, a defendant’s best option is to claim that their 
attempts to invoke a right were actually clear. This Note expects that a linguistic analysis 
would find the invocations likely are clear, even so, clarifying a standard would ensure that 
the matters could be dealt with much more quickly. If the suspect is provided a language 
standard to attain, the court only need to look at the instructions given to the suspect and see 
whether the suspect followed those instructions to invoke rights. 
 158. See supra Section I.C. 
 159. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to 
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21. 
 160. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to 
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21. 
 161. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to Remain 
Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21. 
 162. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to Remain 
Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21. 
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analyses,163 many of these examples have been presented with little 
context and little analysis.164 This Part of the Note reviews the 
scenario identified by other scholars. From the variety of language 
mechanisms employed by custodial interrogation subjects which 
have been identified by linguists, this Note focuses on three types: 
conditionalization, hedging, and reformation.165 This Note seeks to 
put these examples in greater context and through deeper analysis 
than previous scholarship.166 This Part then considers the law’s own 
justification for its expectations of language use and submits  
that these justifications are not sufficient to outweigh the need to 
avoid linguistic injustice through additional protective measures 
that will allow suspects to take advantage of the rights promised to 
them by law.167 
A. The Standard Scene of Custodial Interrogation 
The standard scene168 for custodial interrogation involves a lay 
speaker, who, according to the standards of commonly accepted 
linguistics, is likely to rely on a lay-language ideology containing 
scripts of language that call for indirect indications of intent and 
presumption of cooperation that suggests the conversation partner 
should not resist intuiting the intended meaning of whatever 
communication is produced.169 This lay speaker, equipped with all 
the lay-language skill culturally ingrained throughout the 
speaker’s lifetime, is hauled, presumably against the speaker’s will, 
to a new and situationally hostile environment. Because police are 
in a position of inherent authority, and because much of the 
suspect’s agency has been taken from them, the suspect is likely to 
perceive a significant power asymmetry between the suspect and 
the police,170 and the greater the perceived power asymmetry 
 
 163. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13; Mason, supra note 21. 
 164. See Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21. 
 165. See supra Part I. 
 166. See infra Section III.C. 
 167. See infra Section III.D. 
 168. While they are certainly significant factors, this scene will not account for how 
many times a suspect has been privy to a custodial interrogation, whether or not the suspect 
is a native English speaker, or whether the suspect even speaks English at all. In any given 
interview, when judging the breadth of the cross-cultural pragmatic gap, these are relevant 
issues. Any of the disparities arising from these “cultural” differences can be significantly 
exacerbated if the suspect is a minority. See generally Haviland, supra note 87. 
 169. See supra Section I.C. 
 170. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 6–7. 
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between the conversation participants, the greater the likelihood 
that there will be indirect language in the interaction.171 A suspect 
is likely to presume this will help gain needed favor in the police’s 
eyes.172 In order to gain this favor, the suspects are likely to choose 
indirect speech by, among other things, qualifying their statements, 
softening their language, and choosing a less direct sentence 
formation in which to convey their messages.173 This perceived 
power asymmetry is likely to continue throughout the interaction 
as the police exercise authority over the interrogation’s location, the 
interrogation’s tone, the interrogation’s focus, other aspects of the 
setting, the suspect’s behavior, and the interaction’s potential 
consequences, which are unignorably significant to the suspect.174 
In short, equipped with linguistic scripts of indirectness, and in a 
setting where the power dynamic suggests an additional need for 
indirectness, suspects are entering an environment with an 
extremely heightened and exacting requirement for direct language 
use. But they don’t know it yet. Even so, most of these individuals 
assume their traditional language mechanisms will be capable of 
communicating their intent.175 
In a situation where the stakes are high, the expectations for 
invoking rights are stringent, and the threshold for waiving the 
rights is simple, justice requires a second look at whether fairness 
allows the law to hold a lay speaker to a legal speech standard.  
If the standard remains as it is, people are likely to continue to 
assume indirect ways of speaking are acceptable in these 
circumstances. As has been the case since Davis, invocation of rights 
will be rare, and waiver of rights will abound.176 In terms of 
custodial interrogation, many confessions will be tainted by 
motions to suppress and appeals about equivocal invocations of the 
right to remain silent or the right to counsel.177 The law must decide 
whether it is seeking to perpetuate these confessions, or whether it 
will remain true to the principles established in the Constitution 
and protected by the Miranda warnings, which are in danger of 
 
 171. Id. at 7. 
 172. Mason, supra note 21, at 219. 
 173. See supra Section I.C; infra Section III.C. 
 174. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 7. 
 175. See infra Section III.C; see generally Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21. 
 176. See generally Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21. 
 177. See id. 
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becoming ineffectual for many individuals due to cross-cultural 
pragmatic failure.178 
B. The Communicative Contradiction in Action 
Janet Ainsworth framed the problem poignantly: 
A linguistically informed judge would recognize that speakers in 
powerless positions are quite likely to resort to indirect and 
hedged syntactic forms in lieu of using unmodified imperatives, 
but that utterances in a “powerless” register are intended by their 
users to be no less unequivocal than those that are syntactically 
more direct. . . . Yet, all too frequently, reviewing courts, applying 
hyper-literal readings to these replies, have held that they did not 
constitute successful invocations of the right to counsel or to 
remain silent. Instead of being legally operative requests, these 
replies were deemed infelicitous legal speech acts because they 
took the form of questions, or were framed in the subjunctive 
mood, or preceded the request with softening expressions of 
emotion or desire.179 
One possible reason for this disconnect is that the law is 
choosing to be an obstinate conversation partner by, in a sense, 
exercising willful blindness to the communicative intent of the 
suspect.180 This choice to be uncooperative would mean ignoring 
otherwise obvious indirect communicative intent in favor of  
the unintended facial meaning of the language contrary to  
lay-conversational behaviors and assumptions.181 In this 
application of understanding, the hearer is left with only the surface 
meaning of the words, and the speaker is unable to communicate 
intent indirectly. However, this same conclusion regarding the  
final communicative result can be analyzed in a less cynical way.  
An alternative conclusion to the idea that the law is simply 
being a stubborn and willfully blind speech partner is that a 
different linguistic ideology or culture is at play. As has been 
described,182 lay speakers communicate using a plethora of indirect 
 
 178. See infra Section IV.A. 
 179. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 11. 
 180. One could suggest that this is a very real possibility given the police’s desire to 
solve a crime and the potential pressures to obtain convictions in the justice system. Whether 
or not it is legitimate is irrelevant if the correct protective procedures are implemented as 
suggested by this Note. 
 181. See supra Section I.C. 
 182. See supra Sections I.C, II.A. 
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scripts and mannerisms, while on the other hand, the law has 
established consistent precedent requiring direct speech. When 
speakers from these two distinct language ideologies interact, the 
stage is set for cross-cultural pragmatic failure.183 Regardless of 
whether the law is choosing to be uncooperative or whether the 
speakers are operating from different language cultures, in the end 




C. Indirect Mechanisms Employed in Attempts to Invoke Rights During 
Custodial Interrogation 
Different linguists have pointed out a number of different 
indirect mechanisms employed by custodial interrogation  
subjects, including conditionalization, hedging, tag-questions, 
modal verb usage, use of questions instead of imperatives, and 
rising intonation.185 This section presents and analyzes  
in-context examples of three of these: conditionalization, hedging, 
and reformation—or the transformation of an imperative into  
an interrogative.186 
1. Conditionalization 
Conditionalization occurs when a speaker’s statement is linked 
with a conditional phrase.187 For example, “if” is a conditional in 
which the speaker essentially says, “If X state of the world exists, 
then Y.” However, in indirect speech, conditionalized statements 
are not always meant to be taken literally.188 Thus, when a speaker 
employs a conditional in order to soften their statement, a 
 
 183. See supra Section I.D. 
 184. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21. It should also be mentioned that 
the courts do get it right as well. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); United 
States v. Vanwaart, No. 17-CR-4063-LTS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72062, (N.D. Iowa Apr. 10 2018). 
Even so, the contribution made in this Note will reduce any inconsistencies presently 
occurring in jurisprudence. 
 185. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to 
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21. 
 186. As far as this Note’s author has been able to tell, no one has yet conducted a 
comprehensive empirical study of the case law to determine the specific statistics regarding 
successful invocations of right. 
 187. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 9. 
 188. Id. 
1705 Linguistic Estoppel 
 1705 
conversation partner expecting unequivocal language might see 
the conditional as pivotal to the meaning of the sentence, even 
though actual conditionality was unintended.189 This section 
presents examples from three cases: United States v. Mohr, a recent 
case;190 Kibler v. Kirkland,191 an example brought to attention, 
although not deeply analyzed, by Ainsworth;192 and State v. Effler, 
a case found through independent research.193 The section then 
reviews some additional examples. 
a. United States v. Mohr. In United States v. Mohr, the 
interrogation subject alleged that during his interrogation he said, 
“Should I get a lawyer at this time? . . . I think I should get one.”194 
Subsequently, when the officers asked to record the interrogation, 
he alleged that he said, “I want my lawyer. . . . [I]f you want this 
recorded, I want a lawyer present.”195 While the court did not credit 
the first statement with having actually been said, it did analyze the 
second statement, agreeing with the district court “that this request 
was conditioned on whether the interview was recorded, and that 
since the interview was not recorded, Mohr’s condition for 
requiring counsel was not met.”196 In so doing, the court 
inadvertently heightened the standard required for assertions of 
right in that the assertion now needs to be not only clear, but also 
unqualified, in order to warrant efficacy. Under an indirect speech 
act analysis, the condition placed on the statement—”if you want 
this recorded”—is not relevant to the actual contextual intent to 
invoke the right to counsel. 
b. Kibler v. Kirkland. In Kibler v. Kirkland,197 as the police 
approached the topic of the Miranda rights, the suspect, Kibler, 
stated, “If I’m going to jail on anything, I want to have my attorney 
present before I start speaking about whatever it is you guys are 
talking about . . . . I really would like my attorney if I’m going to be 
 
 189. See id. 
 190. United States v. Mohr, 772 F.3d 1143 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 191. Kibler v. Kirkland, No. C 05-0347 JF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55719 (N.D. Cal.  
July 27, 2006). 
 192. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 9. 
 193. State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880 (Iowa 2009). 
 194. Mohr, 772 F.3d at 1145. 
 195. Id. (alterations in original). 
 196. Id. at 1147. 
 197. Kibler v. Kirkland, No. C 05-0347 JF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55719 (N.D. Cal.  
July 27, 2006) (cited in Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 9). 
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questioned because I don’t really know what’s going on.”198 The 
interrogators responded to his statement suggesting that they were 
also trying to figure out was going on.199 Again Kibler reiterated his 
point stating that “I have no problem with you guys questioning 
me . . . I just, if I’m going to jail, I just want my attorney around 
before I answer any questions.”200 The interrogators persisted with 
the reading of the Miranda warning and Kibler agreed to talk 
“because [he] want[ed] to know what [was] going on.”201 The court 
stated that Kibler never mentioned a lawyer post-Miranda, and that 
before the Miranda had been fully given the right could not be 
invoked, even though Kibler made clear in his interrogation that he 
was familiar with what he identified as the “Miranda rights.”202  
A linguistic view of this exchange raises the question as to whether 
Kibler would have successfully asserted his right if he had used  
un-conditionalized, direct language.  
c. State v. Effler. The concurring opinion in State v. Effler analyzed 
Effler’s behavior explicitly in terms of its conditionality.203 During 
the course of Effler’s Miranda, the following exchange occurred: 
EFFLER: I do want a court-appointed lawyer. 
DETECTIVE: Okay. 
EFFLER: If I go to jail.204 
The police officer insisted on finishing the Miranda, and then, when 
Effler had agreed to talk, proceeded to engage Effler in an 
interrogation.205 The concurring opinion analyzing the exchange 
stated that “other state courts have interpreted similar conditional 
requests for counsel as ambiguous. . . . [T]he side that would 
reverse the trial court fails to recognize the inherent ambiguity in 
Effler’s statement.”206 The judge pointed out the multiplicity of 
meanings that could be derived from Effler’s “conditional clause” 
and stated that under one meaning, “Effler’s statement was 
conditional and ambiguous. He wanted a lawyer if and when he 
went to jail. . . . As the condition of going to jail had not been 
 
 198. Id. at *3–6. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at *16. 
 203. State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880 (Iowa 2009). 
 204. Id. at 885. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 888. 
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fulfilled, the conditional nature of the request rendered it 
ambiguous.”207 But the judge did not stop there. He continued: 
 Another interpretation of Effler’s statement is “I want a lawyer 
if I am going to jail.” Even under this interpretation, it is arguable 
whether the condition had been fulfilled. . . . It could be argued 
the condition “if I’m going to jail” had been satisfied at the time 
Effler requested counsel, since Effler was indeed going to jail after 
the conclusion of the interview. However, to establish the 
condition of Effler’s request for an attorney (i.e. jail) had been 
satisfied requires changing the word “go” to “going.” Such a 
change expands the meaning of Effler’s statement.208 
While it is questionable whether a suspect would reasonably 
distinguish between having a lawyer while with the police and 
having a lawyer after being in jail, it is almost certain that Effler did 
not analyze his own language with such scrutiny as he attempted 
to invoke his right to counsel. 
d. Additional examples. The idea that conditional language is 
meant to be explicit is widely shared between courts. The California 
Supreme Court held that a defendant’s statement that he wanted a 
lawyer if he was going to be charged was conditional and thus 
ambiguous.209 The concurring justice in Effler also cites and 
describes cases in Arizona and in Louisiana in which the courts 
determined that conditionalized invocations of the right to counsel 
were equivocal and thus inefficacious.210 On the other hand, one 
linguist reported her experience as an expert witness in which the 
interrogation of the suspect ended when he said, “Uh, you know 
what. . . . Yeah, I think I better. If I’m going to jail, I think I better 
talk to a lawyer first. I think, I think, I better talk to a lawyer.”211 It 
should be noted, though, that the decision to deem this as an 
acceptable invocation of right was made by the interrogating 
officers and not by the courts. 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. People v. Gonzalez, 104 P.3d 98, 105–07 (Cal. 2005). 
 210. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880 (Appel, J., concurring) (first citing State v. Newell, 132 P.3d 
833, 842 (Ariz. 2006) (holding that “If I’m going to jail, I want to talk to my lawyer,” was 
inefficacious); then citing State v. Genter, 872 So. 2d 552, 571 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that 
“I already told you everything and if this is gonna continue I’ll just wait for a lawyer” was 
insufficient to avail a suspect of his rights)). 
 211. Mason, supra note 21, at 213. 
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2. Hedging 
Hedging occurs when a speaker uses softening language, such 
as “I think,” “maybe,” or conditionals like “could,” “would,” and 
“should” in their language.212 Softening language can decrease the 
impact of the words and appear more polite because it lessens the 
imposition on the hearer.213 Such language is an intent muffler 
when the hearer has an expectation for direct speech. This section 
reviews three cases: State v. Jennings,214 an example used, but not 
heavily contextualized or analyzed, by Ainsworth,215 and two cases 
found from independent research, State v. Broussard,216 and 
Matthews v. McKee.217 The section then highlights additional 
examples provided by Ainsworth.218 
a. State v. Jennings. In State v. Jennings, during the interrogation, 
Jennings said, “I think maybe I need to talk to a lawyer.”219 The 
detective sought to clarify and Jennings repeated, “I think maybe I 
need to talk to a lawyer.”220 The detective stopped questioning, but 
subsequently a different detective continued the interrogation.221 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to continue to allow for a 
more lenient standard than the U.S. Supreme Court222 and 
heightened its expectation for direct language to match Davis,223 
stating that the language was similar to that used in Davis and “[a]s 
such, it was ‘ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in 
light of the circumstances would have understood only that the 
suspect might be invoking the right to counsel.’ Therefore, 
Jennings’ statement was insufficient to invoke his right to 
counsel . . . .”224 In that case, the court explained that it was the 
 
 212. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 276–77; Ainsworth, Right to 
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21. 
 213. Mason, supra note 21, at 218–19. 
 214. State v. Jennings, 647 N.W.2d 142 (Wis. 2002). 
 215. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 17. 
 216. State v. Broussard, 224 So. 3d 23 (La. Ct. App. 2017). 
 217. Matthews v. McKee, No. 06-CV-15253, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4454 (E.D. Mich.  
Jan. 22, 2009). 
 218. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 9. 
 219. Jennings, 647 N.W.2d at 145. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 153. Note that the dissent in this case wrote a thorough argument defending 
the previous liberal standard regarding whether suspects had efficaciously invoked rights. Id. 
 223. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
 224. Jennings, 647 N.W.2d at 151 (citation omitted). 
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ambiguity in the statement that made the language inefficacious.225 
That ambiguity is contained in the softening words “I think” and 
“maybe.”226 Had Jennings used unsoftened, bald language, his 
invocation likely would have been efficacious. 
b. State v. Broussard. In State v. Broussard, the reviewing court 
refused to correct the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress 
when during the interrogation the suspect said, “I really—I really 
would like—I think I want a lawyer on . . . This is not right . . . .”227 
On examination the interrogating officer specified that she did not 
terminate the interview because “he continued to talk,” and “he did 
not say I want an attorney.”228 The difference between the language 
that interrogating officer testified would have caused her to stop 
the interview and the language that the suspect actually used is the 
softening language.229 In his request the suspect said “I really,” “I 
really,” “would like,” “I think,” and “I think.” After those words, 
the language of the suspect, “I want a lawyer,” are semantically 
identical to the language the interrogating officer said would have 
been enough for her to terminate the interrogation.230 
c. Matthews v. McKee. In Matthews v. McKee, the interrogating 
officers insisted that the interrogation was the suspect’s only chance 
to really tell his side of the story—otherwise they would not know 
what it was and could not send his side of the story to the 
prosecutor.231 Subsequently, Matthews, the interrogation subject, 
stated, “I get a chance to speak to a lawyer . . . .”232 The officer said, 
“Do you? Sure. If that’s what you want, but if you say that to me 
now . . . I’m not gonna hear what your side of the story is.”233 The 
exchange continued back and forth including one statement from 
Matthews that “I want you to understand that I want—But the last 
time I went through this, . . . [the detective] said that it’s best to talk 
to a lawyer. It’s best to have a lawyer present, and I’m pretty sure 
you’ll tell me the same thing.”234 The court stated “that while 
 
 225. Id. at 153. 
 226. Mason, supra note 21, at 218–19. 
 227. State v. Broussard, 224 So. 3d 23, 33 (La. Ct. App. 2017). 
 228. Id. at 32. 
 229. See id. at 32–33. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Matthews v. McKee, No. 06-CV-15253, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4454, at *8–9  
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2009). 
 232. Id. at *9. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at *9–10. 
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Petitioner made references to speaking with a lawyer, he did not 
make an unequivocal request for counsel during that interview,” 
and that the comments that he did make were “not clear and 
unambiguous requests for counsel,”235 after which they cited a long 
list of cases in which the softening language of the suspect had 
sterilized the request for counsel.236 
d. Additional examples. Janet Ainsworth cites a laundry list of 
cases in which softening language was used to reduce the 
“harshness of a bald demand for a lawyer.”237 Applying indirect 
speech act theory liberally, Ainsworth claims that in each instance 
the hedging caused the request for a lawyer to be deemed 
“ambiguous or equivocal.”238 These included the following 
statements: “I think I would like to talk to a lawyer,”239 “I think I 
will talk to a lawyer,”240 “it seems like what I need is a lawyer . . . I 
do want a lawyer,”241 and “actually, you know what, I’m gonna call 
my lawyer. I don’t feel comfortable.”242 Ainsworth asserts that these 
“are examples of the kind of attempted invocations held to be legal 
nullities” due to “softening language.”243 
 
 235. Id. at *23 (internal quotes omitted). Of course, the court’s explanation is always 
longer.  In this case there was a thorough pattern of the petitioner initiating contact with the 
interrogator, potentially to inquire further about being able to speak to him with a lawyer 
present, which the interrogator consistently denied. 
 236. Id. at *23–24. The court’s list of softened language in full reads: 
See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–62 (suspect’s statement that “maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer” was ambiguous and not a clear request for counsel); Ledbetter v. Edwards, 
35 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir. 1994) (statement that “it would be nice” to have an 
attorney was not a clear request for counsel); see also Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 
1071–72 (9th Cir. 2003) (state court determination that statements “I think I would 
like to talk to a lawyer” and “should I be telling you, or should I talk to an 
attorney” were ambiguous was not unreasonable); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 
198 (4th Cir. 2000) (“I think I need a lawyer” was not a clear request for counsel); 
Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61, 63–65 (2d Cir. 1996) (“I think I want a lawyer” and 
“Do you think I need a lawyer?” were not clear requests for counsel); but cf.  
Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 926 (6th Cir. 2004) (statement “maybe I should talk 
to an attorney by the name of William Evans” was an unequivocal request for 
counsel where the suspect specifically named his attorney and gave the police 
officer the attorney’s business card). 
Id. 
 237. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 9. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. (citing Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 240. Id. (citing State v. Farrah, 735 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. 2007)). 
 241. Id. (citing Oliver v. Runnels, No. CIV S-02-1147 GEB DAD P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
50704 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2006)). 
 242. Id. (citing People v. McMahon, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 243. Id. 
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3. Reformation 
Reformation occurs when commands or requests are reshaped 
syntactically to bear the form of a question.244 Questions are a 
common way to couch a direct command or request in more polite 
terms.245 The classic linguistics example “Can you pass the salt?”, 
although formed as a question, is not an inquiry regarding the 
theoretical physical ability of the hearer to pass the salt; rather, this 
is an utterance whose function is to command or request, but  
is merely couched in, or syntactically formed as, a question.246 
While linguistically there is both a question and a request, the 
primary purpose is the request.247 Indirect speech act analysis  
says the same is true for requests for counsel.248 This section  
reviews three cases: two cases brought to attention but not  
heavily contextualized or analyzed by Ainsworth,249 Dormire v. 
Wilkinson250 and Commonwealth v. Redmond,251 and one case found 
through independent research, United States v. Hawkins.252 The 
section then presents some additional examples originally cited  
by Ainsworth.253 
a. Dormire v. Wilkinson. In Dormire v. Wilkinson,254 during 
interrogation the suspect asked if he could call his girlfriend and 
was told no.255 He then asked “Could I call my lawyer?”256 The court 
concluded “that Wilkinson’s question ‘Could I call my lawyer?’ was 
not an unambiguous request for counsel,” and justified their 
finding, stating that “[o]ther courts have come to the same 
conclusion when presented with similarly worded statements.”257 
One is left to wonder whether, had he phrased his request in an 
imperative rather than an interrogative, or even indicated the 
 
 244. See McGowan et al., supra note 50, at 497. 
 245. See Mason, supra note 21, at 218–19. 
 246. See McGowan et al., supra note 50, at 496. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 8. 
 249. Id. at 8, 17. 
 250. Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 251. Commonwealth v. Redmond, 568 S.E.2d 695 (Va. 2002). 
 252. United States v. Hawkins, 554 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
 253. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 8. 
 254. Dormire, 249 F.3d 801 (cited in Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 8). 
 255. Id. at 803. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 805. 
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nature of the language as a request by adding “please,”258 if the 
result would have been different. 
b. Commonwealth v. Redmond. In Commonwealth v. Redmond, 
the interrogator ignored the suspect’s constitutional rights to due 
process and a trial, instead assuring Redmond that this would be 
the “only opportunity you’re ever going to talk and give your 
side.”259 Redmond responded, saying, “Can I speak to my lawyer? 
I can’t even talk to [a] lawyer before I make any kinds of comments 
or anything?”260 In response to the limited opportunities he would 
have to make his story known, these comments, when recognized 
as what they are—requests for counsel—appear almost desperate 
in their attempts to convey the intent to invoke the right to counsel. 
However, when discussing context, the court totally ignored the 
lay-language ideology that allows for requests formed as questions, 
and held that Redmond’s words “were not a clear and 
unambiguous assertion of his right to counsel. . . . At best, the 
defendant’s questions may be construed as a desire on his part to 
obtain more information about his Miranda rights.”261 Curiously, 
the court did not give credence to the Commonwealth’s argument 
that Redmond had known how to invoke his right based on other 
aspects of the conversation.262 For the court, all the evidence 
regarding this utterance was self-contained. 
c. United States v. Hawkins. In United States v. Hawkins, 
following the suspect’s request “could I get my lawyer to come now 
or [inaudible]?”, the interrogating agent worked at Hawkins until 
he engaged in the interrogation.263 When the court discussed 
whether Hawkins’s rights had been violated, it stated that 
“analyzed without considering its intonational context, [the 
utterance] could be interpreted either as an informational request 
or as invoking the right to counsel.”264 But the court agreed with the 
testimony of the interrogating agent who suggested that “he 
understood Hawkins to be asking him whether ‘it was okay for him 
to call his attorney to come down, to be present.’”265 The court went 
 
 258. See McGowan et al., supra note 50, at 498. 
 259. Commonwealth v. Redmond, 568 S.E.2d 695, 697 (Va. 2002) (emphasis added). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 700. 
 262. Id. at 698. 
 263. United States v. Hawkins, 554 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
 264. Id. at 680–81. 
 265. Id. at 681. 
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further stating that video evidence allowed the court “to listen to 
the intonation of Hawkins’s question and to observe his demeanor 
in posing the question.”266 The court felt that “[b]ased on this 
critical assessment of more than the verbal formulation of 
Hawkins’s question . . . Hawkins did not articulate his desire to 
have counsel present sufficiently clearly.”267 The court failed to 
realize that intonation is not necessarily linked to the syntactic 
formulation of a phrase and its intent to inquire or to direct, but 
rather intonation is often linked to politeness.268 In this case, two 
features of polite speech, the reformation of the request as a 
question, and, presumably, a polite up-tone, sounded the death 
knell for this suspect’s attempt to invoke his right. 
d. Additional examples. Regarding invocations of right in the 
form of a question, Ainsworth, liberally applying indirect speech 
act theory, provided another list of examples where the court 
interpreted the requests to be “merely questions about the 
theoretical availability of counsel rather than as requests for 
counsel.”269 She points out that the courts somehow 
compartmentalize the “preceding Miranda warnings telling [the 
interrogation subjects] that they had the right to assistance of a 
lawyer during questioning” as distinct from the actual attempts to 
invoke rights and instead interpret the “literal meaning of the 
arrestees’ utterances as though they were unrelated in meaning.”270 
Examples of assertions of right held to be inefficacious because they 
were framed in a question include “Can I get my lawyer?”,271 “May 
I call a lawyer? Can I call a lawyer?”,272 “Do you mind if I have my 
lawyer with me?”,273 “Could I get a lawyer?”,274 and “Can I speak 
to an attorney before I answer the question to find out what he 
would have to tell me?”275 Positing that every one of these suspects 
 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 268. CRUTTENDEN, supra note 70, at 335. 
 269. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 8. 
 270. Id. (italics added). 
 271. Id. (citing State v. Nixon, 687 So. 2d 114 (La. Ct. App. 1996)). 
 272. Id. (citing State v. Payne, 833 So. 2d 927 (La. 2002)). 
 273. Id. (citing United States v. Whitefeather, Crim. No. 05-388 (DWF/RLE), 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17239 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2006)). 
 274. Id. (citing United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 275. Id. (citing Taylor v. Carey, No. CIV S-03-0477 MCE KJM P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12686 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2007)). 
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was only inquiring about the “theoretical availability of counsel”276 
is almost too much to swallow. 
While the courts retain the “reasonable police officer” standard 
for interpreting ambiguous, or indirect, invocations of right, they 
continue to ignore what any linguist would emphatically proclaim: 
any “reasonable speaker of English”277 would surely recognize 
these utterances as intended to invoke the referenced right. This 
collision between indirect speech and the expectations for 
directness contained in legal settings results in many frustrated 
suspects, implied waivers of rights, confessions, and appeals—all 
because of a cross-cultural pragmatic failure in which one party’s 
tendency for indirect speech is not recognized as legally efficacious 
by a speech-culture with expectations of directness.278 
D. Justification for the Legal-Ideology of Language 
While the impact of the legal-language ideology on custodial 
interrogation subjects is real, the caselaw defining this ideology 
seeks to justify the law’s stringent expectations of language. In Davis, 
the Court sought to justify its rule stating that 
[t]he rationale underlying Edwards is that the police must respect 
a suspect’s wishes regarding his right to have an attorney present 
during custodial interrogation. But when the officers conducting 
the questioning reasonably do not know whether or not the suspect 
wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the immediate cessation of 
questioning “would transform the Miranda safeguards into 
wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative 
activity,” because it would needlessly prevent the police from 
questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if the suspect 
did not wish to have a lawyer present.279 
 
 276. Id. 
 277. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 127, at 55. This is an unfortunate standard  
by which a police officer may be a reasonable police officer, but not a reasonable speaker  
of English. 
 278. The author has conducted one beta-study on this topic placing native English 
speakers in role-play situations to determine whether they would be able to use speech 
sufficiently efficacious to invoke their rights.  In this study, of the four subjects, three were 
unable to invoke their rights, at least one confessed, and the fourth unequivocally invoked 
his right to counsel. The research also suggested that women may have greater difficulty 
using appropriately direct language than men. This research report is on file with the author. 
See also Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13; Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra 
note 21; Mason, supra note 21. 
 279. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) (citation omitted). 
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The Court went on to justify the decision further, stating that 
because police officers were the ones who would have to apply this 
ruling, a bright-line rule could “be applied by officers in the real 
world of investigation and interrogation without unduly 
hampering the gathering of information.”280 To make the rule more 
simple, the Court refused to accept statements that “might” be an 
invocation of right as efficacious.281 Otherwise “[p]olice officers 
would be forced to make difficult judgment calls about whether the 
suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not said so, with 
the threat of suppression if they guess wrong.”282  
While this prosecutorial mindset for enforcing a higher 
standard of legally efficacious speech in these scenarios increases 
the availability of confessionary evidence, these standards fail to 
account for the language customs on which interrogation subjects 
are relying in order to communicate their intent to invoke their 
Supreme Court–promised rights.283 However, beyond the law’s 
acceptance of lay speaker pragmatic meaning (the contextual, 
underlying, indirect intent of the speech), other linguistic principles 
can nevertheless bridge the gap between these two disparate and 
highly consequential ideologies. 
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP, CLOSING THE CHASM, AND RECTIFYING 
CROSS-CULTURAL PRAGMATIC FAILURE 
The examples of suspects attempting to use indirect language 
in order to invoke rights, and the judiciary’s consistent 
interpretation of these attempts as if they had no more than surface 
meaning is symptomatic of the cross-cultural pragmatic failure that 
occurs when speakers from different language ideologies fail to 
actually communicate.284 Linguistic principles such as indirect 
speech acts and cross-cultural pragmatic failure can be used as tools 
to prevent these linguistic injustices and to support and buttress the 
rule of law in a new way through bridging the gap between lay 
language and legal language.285 This Part considers the 
ramifications of a legal acceptance of indirect speech acts, examines 
 
 280. Id. at 461. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. See supra Parts I, III. 
 284. Supra Parts I, III. 
 285. See infra Section IV.B. 
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the merits of cross-cultural pragmatic education, and presents a 
new Miranda that can help close the current chasm between legal 
language and lay language in custodial interrogation settings. 
A. Total Recognition of Pragmatic Meaning and Indirect Speech Acts 
Linguistic scholars have summarized different approaches 
courts have taken in responding to allegedly ambiguous 
invocations of right.286  
First, the threshold standard requires that suspects attempting 
to invoke rights attain a certain level of clarity in their speech.287 
This standard most closely reflects the standard established by 
Davis.288 However, linguists have rejected this standard because it 
would present a linguistic injustice in which speakers are unable to 
invoke rights because they are unaware of the clarity expectations 
established by the legal system.289  
Second, the clarification standard, which was expressly rejected 
by the Supreme Court in Davis, requires investigating officers to 
clarify with a suspect when the suspect offers what could arguably 
be an ambiguous invocation of right.290 
Third, the voluntariness standard, most often applied to 
determine if rights were waived, reviews the context in an attempt 
to discern if the confession appeared voluntary.291  
Fourth, the per se standard holds that any and all references to 
a lawyer are sufficient to warrant invocation of the rights.292 
Although at least one scholar suggests that this standard would go 
the farthest in protecting lay speakers of English from the 
disadvantage that occurs when interacting with the law,293 the 
Supreme Court expressly disavowed this as a viable standard, 
 
 286. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13; Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, 
supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21. 
 287. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 302–06; Mason, supra note 21, at 220–21. 
 288. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
 289. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 302–06; Mason, supra note 21, at 
220–21. It could be argued that the solution proposed in this paper is similar to the threshold 
standard. However, this categorization would omit the critical offering from this Note: that 
lay speakers must be educated as to what the acceptable standards for effective legal speech 
actually are. 
 290. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460; Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 308–15; 
Mason, supra note 21, at 220–21. 
 291. Mason, supra note 21, at 220. 
 292. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 306–08; Mason, supra note 21, at 221. 
 293. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 306–08. 
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refusing to “require law enforcement officers to cease questioning 
immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal 
reference to an attorney . . . because it would needlessly prevent the 
police from questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if 
the suspect did not wish to have a lawyer present.”294 In one article, 
Ainsworth suggested that the law depart entirely from its strict 
linguistic ideology in favor of an interpretive standard more 
embracing of ambiguity and contextual pragmatic meaning.295 
While other minds grapple with the overarching linguistic ideology 
that should govern law, this Note attempts to provide an instant 
solution to bridge the gap between legal language and lay 
language. The conflict between such exacting legal standards on 
one hand and blanket acceptances of indirect speech on the other 
resolves itself when the linguistic playing field is leveled through 
cross-cultural pragmatic education. 
One potential solution is to propose that the legal system adjust 
its language expectations to take into account indirect speech 
acts.296 Miranda warnings are written for a lay audience, so the 
argument that lay language should be the standard for interpreting 
responses to them does have merit. Further, because indirect 
speech is so ingrained in conversational English culture, it appears 
downright uncooperative when legal actors resist applying a  
lay-language interpretation to the speech provided by non-legal 
actors in legal settings. The disparity between the socially 
assumable meaning and the superficial interpretation gleaned by 
the legal actor could be termed, in a sense, willful blindness.297  
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of interpreting lay 
speech in a legal setting by using a lay-language standard instead 
of imposing a legal-language standard is the principle of estoppel. 
Estoppel generally connotes the idea that when a person has relied 
on a particular state of facts or representations in order to make a 
decision with significant consequences, it would be unjust not to 
satisfy the expectations created by the reliance.298 When a person 
 
 294. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459–60. 
 295. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 14–19. 
 296. This is the approach that Janet Ainsworth suggests in id. 
 297. Carrying the metaphor forward, the resulting tort would be something akin to 
negligent denial of constitutional right. 
 298. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626 (Ala. 1868), a case commonly used to 
demonstrate a scenario where modern-day estoppel principles would render enforceable 
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has acted in significant reliance, with a reasonable perception of 
particular expectations, the law has determined that it is just to 
respect those expectations and hold that the person’s reliance was 
justified and ought to protect them from harm.299 In terms of 
language, it would follow that because lay individuals have relied 
upon culturally ingrained linguistic scripts allowing indirectness as 
an acceptable means of communication, it would be unjust not to 
satisfy that person’s expectation that indirect communication 
would be understood by the conversation partner. In other words, 
if a person, in forming their attempts to create legally efficacious 
language, is relying on societal expectations that indirect speech 
will be sufficient to communicate that intent, then it would be 
unjust not to satisfy that expectation by instead holding that person 
to a legal-speech standard. Even though this principle of linguistic 
estoppel may be an appealing solution in an ideal world, it may not 
be realistic. 
An unequivocal proposal that the law recognize and interpret 
indirect speech acts encountered in different scenarios is 
admittedly problematic. Interpretation of pragmatic meaning 
requires at least some level of interpreting the surrounding context. 
But, as has been described, the law intentionally avoids situations 
and areas where an investigation of context will be required to 
ascertain the appropriate outcome. This is true for statutory 
interpretation’s “plain meaning rule,” contract law’s “four corners” 
doctrine, and tort law’s view of affirmative behavior as the 
governing factor over unexpressed intention.300 While reluctance to 
apply contextual interpretation is not a bright-line rule, and is 
somewhat contingent upon the philosophy of the judge,301 without 
a more robust willingness to negotiate the information that can be 
derived from context, navigating the world of pragmatic meaning 
may be somewhat out of reach. This may continue to be true until 
there is a defined, objective way to interpret subjective context 
 
what otherwise would not be a contract. See Search Results for “Kirksey v Kirksey 
promissory estoppel,” GOOGLE, http://google.com (enter “Kirksey v Kirksey promissory 
estoppel” into search bar and execute search). 
 299. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626. While Kirksey itself rendered the “contract” unenforceable, it 
is fairly accepted that the same circumstances today would render the promise at issue 
enforceable under the promissory estoppel doctrine. 
 300. See supra Section II.A. 
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(something that may not be possible, or desirable).302 So, absent an 
objective method for judges to interpret subjective context,303 a 
different solution will have to bridge the cultural gap. 
B. Cross-Cultural Pragmatic Education 
While the following proposed solution may not solve each and 
every area of law where cross-cultural pragmatic failure results in 
a breakdown of communication, educating suspects on how to 
speak with the appropriate level of directness during custodial 
interrogations could, at least in the arena of custodial 
interrogations, bridge the gap between the lay- and legal-language 
ideologies at play. Legislators are well aware of the scrutiny with 
which laws will be read, and parties to a contract understand that 
many courts will not look beyond the four corners of the document 
in order to discern intent—they understand that they must put their 
intent clearly in writing. But the same is not always true for lay 
speakers, who lack this nuanced pragmatic education about the 
law’s language expectations. Although expecting the law to bend 
its linguistic culture to match society’s linguistic culture is not 
necessarily realistic, helping create a ladder for lay people to reach 
and understand the law’s language expectations is a workable 
solution that would have significant impacts.  
Janet Ainsworth points out that when speakers do not know the 
appropriate way to create legally efficacious speech, they may “fail 
to achieve their desired legal outcomes and instead expose 
 
 302. An objective way to interpret subjective context would be the gold-standard  
way to apply pragmatic meaning to the law. But the idea seems to be a missing link, the 
discovery of which could transform the interaction between language and the law. However, 
given that language perpetually evolves with society, this may not be possible, or even 
desirable as it would likely be constantly changing and could limit language development 
and progression. 
 303. One alternative solution would be to place questions of linguistic intent before a 
jury. Presumably, if the standards for English communication are as ascertainable as 
linguists say (note that claiming too far to the contrary, that language is not a negotiation of 
meaning between speakers who share mutual assumptions about language use, eventually 
results in the argument that, because language is not definite, no one can understand 
anyone—this is simply not true), then the question of what was meant by what was said 
could be viewed as a factual determination most appropriate for the jury. Certainly, a jury 
would be more willing to navigate the corridors of a contextual negotiation in interpreting 
meaning than a court, but regardless of how straightforwardly linguistics might deal  
with some of these issues, the sheer number of questions riding on this issue could  
make giving the question to the jury economically unreasonable. Further, it is unlikely  
that such a standard would satisfy or conform with the law’s expectations for reliability  
and determinacy. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:6 (2021) 
1720 
them[selves] to unintended and unforeseen legal consequences. 
These unfortunate results are particularly likely when the speaker 
lacks the legal training needed to know how to shape legally 
felicitous speech acts.”304 Because “[l]egally naive speakers are 
often unaware that a script exists prescribing the language needed 
for legal efficacy,” they are often “unable to achieve their desired 
legal ends.”305 Rather than interpreting the potentially subjective 
lay language rampant in suspects’ attempts to invoke their Miranda 
rights, the law could implement simple procedures to educate 
individuals on the pragmatic expectations of the new language 
culture in which they find themselves. 
Subjects of custodial interrogation are already informed of their 
Miranda rights. But the barrier to their exercise of those rights is  
an inability to meet the linguistic threshold required to invoke 
them.306 Rather than announcing the rights and leaving the path to 
obtain them obscure, the law should reinforce the importance of 
those rights by adding an additional protection that indicates  
to custodial interrogation subjects the language threshold required 
to invoke them or waive them. In other words, the law should 
educate these suspects on the pragmatic expectations of the new 
language culture—the law’s language culture—so that these 
suspects do not try to communicate using scripts that were reliable 
in a lay-language setting but that are ineffectual in a legal setting. 
One linguistic scholar argues that cross-cultural pragmatic 
failure, like the failure apparent in custodial interrogation settings, 
can be overcome through express pragmatic education.307 She argues 
that “we do a grave disservice . . . if we expect [speakers of a 
differing language-culture] simply to ‘absorb’ pragmatic norms 
without explicit formalization.”308 But “this problem can be 
overcome only by giving the [speaker] the tools to make the 
processes of pragmatic decision-making explicit.”309 She suggests 
that “[s]ensitizing learners to expect cross-cultural differences in 
the linguistic realizations of politeness, truthfulness, etc.,” is 
essential to helping speakers of other language ideologies bridge 
the pragmatic gap and actually reach a level of effective 
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communication and understanding.310 In this way she argues that 
speakers can seek to “eliminat[e] simplistic and ungenerous 
interpretations of people whose linguistic behaviour is superficially 
different from their own.”311 
Because suspects (lay-language speakers in legal settings) are 
unlikely to divine this linguistic disparity on their own, education 
is essential in order to eliminate the cross-cultural gap between the 
lay- and legal-linguistic ideologies. Otherwise, the law will 
continue to be perceived as an uncooperative conversation partner 
by those who are unable to successfully communicate their intent, 
and by those who recognize the reasons the disparity is 
occurring.312 Suspects’ constitutional rights, protected by the 
Miranda warning, will continue to erode simply because the 
Miranda rights themselves will be made inefficacious and moot 
through their inaccessibility to individuals untrained in legal 
linguistic ideology. 
In order to bridge this gap, the legislature through statute, the 
executive branch through regulation of policy and procedure, or 
the judiciary through prophylactic protection of constitutional 
right, must implement a new standard to ensure the continued 
protection of the Miranda rights as a legitimate barrier between  
the inherent due-process dangers of custodial interrogation and 
suspects’ constitutional rights.313 Regardless of whether the 
legislature, the executive, or the judiciary is the impetus for the 
solution, one of these bodies in the law should implement what 
could be termed an “additional Miranda.” This additional 
procedure is a requirement that interrogators inform custodial 
interrogation subjects not only of their rights, but (1) the type, or 
directness, of language the interrogators expect to hear in order to 
invoke the rights that have been listed, and (2) the types of 
language and behaviors that will indicate to the interrogators that 
 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See, e.g., Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13; Ainsworth, Right to Remain 
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 313. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966). The Miranda has already been 
termed a prophylactic protection of constitutional right. In other words, the Supreme Court 
has raised the floor in order to protect underlying constitutional rights. As the Miranda itself 
is already extra-constitutional, memorializing it likely wouldn’t be problematic (though, a 
discussion to this effect is beyond this Note’s scope). Further, amending the prophylactic 
requirement to actually effectuate its intent is even less problematic as it would serve to 
justify the existence of extra-constitutional rights in the first place. 
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the suspect is waiving their rights and is willing to have what they 
say used against them in a court of law.  
Currently, the Miranda warning includes the following: 
1. You have the right to remain silent. 
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court 
of law. 
3. You have the right to an attorney. 
4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you. 
5. Do you understand the rights I have just read to you? 
6. With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?314 
Often, interrogators will check for understanding between each 
warning, and they are required to obtain a confirmation of general 
understanding in the fifth part of the warning. This pattern is likely 
effective in terms of informing suspects about their rights and 
putting them on notice as to the significance of the conversation. 
However, as is, the Miranda warning fails to ensure its own 
accessibility because it either (1) incorrectly presumes that speakers 
will be capable of using the appropriate language necessary to 
invoke the right simply by virtue of having been put on notice, or 
(2) it ignores that people may not understand the linguistic clarity 
necessary in order to take advantage of the rights. 
The rights could be made more effective and become a greater 
protection to constitutional rights through the addition of two 
warnings: one that educates the suspect on the appropriate 
standard of clarity in speech and behavior necessary to invoke the 
rights, and a second that educates the suspect on what speech and 
behavior will be considered a waiver of right. This new set of 
warnings could take the following form: 
1. You have the right to remain silent. 
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court 
of law. 
3. You have the right to an attorney. 
4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you. 
 
 314. Miranda Warning, supra note 107. 
1723 Linguistic Estoppel 
 1723 
5. In order to invoke any of these rights, you must do so by clear, 
unambiguous, unequivocal, and direct language. 
5.A Silence will not be sufficient to invoke the right to 
silence. 
5.B Asking about whether an attorney is available will not 
invoke the right to have counsel present. 
5.C In order to invoke these rights, you must inform us 
explicitly that you are invoking the particular right. 
6. In order to waive these rights, you may sign the form we are 
about to present to you, or you may continue to answer our 
questions without invoking these rights. 
6.A Even if you do not sign the waiver, if you continue to 
answer our questions voluntarily it may be considered a 
waiver of your rights. 
6.B If you contact us to offer additional details regarding this 
case without expressly invoking your rights it may be 
considered a waiver of your rights. 
7. Do you understand the rights I have just read to you? 
8. With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me? 
The standard for clear speech has been expressed in this 
formulation. If this was the chosen method, investigators could also 
offer examples of effective speech by explaining to the suspect that 
phrases such as “Can I have a lawyer?” or “I think I might want a 
lawyer” would not be sufficiently clear to invoke right, but that 
phrases such as “I invoke my right to have an attorney with me” or 
“I invoke my right to silence and won’t say anything to you” are 
sufficient to invoke the rights. 
A different set of investigators may not require such an exacting 
standard. In that case, the warning might look more like this: 
1. You have the right to remain silent. 
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court 
of law. 
3. You have the right to an attorney. 
4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you. 
5. If you make any statement that suggests to us that you might 
want a lawyer, or that you do not want to speak with us, then 
we will end this conversation. 
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6. If you sign the waiver, or if you continue to speak to us, we will 
assume you have waived your rights and agree to speak to us 
without invoking your rights. 
7. Do you understand the rights I have just read to you? 
8. With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me? 
Regardless of whether the requirement instituted comes from 
the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary, the rule need not be 
a specific requirement for a specific set of words as long as the 
requirement necessitates that suspects are informed of the type of 
language that will effectively communicate to the investigators the 
suspect’s intent to invoke the right. Regardless of which language 
standards the Supreme Court has or has not accepted as effective, 
different investigators could apply different thresholds for clarity 
and thus meet the requirement, as long as they communicated to 
the interrogation subject what the applicable threshold for invoking 
the right actually is. This removes any need to interpret context or 
ambiguity because the understood threshold, and the investigators’ 
adherence to that threshold, would, in and of themselves, 
demonstrate the appropriate standard for any court to whom the 
question was presented. Assuming the threshold had been 
properly conveyed and understood,315 the language then would not 
need to be interpreted but would, on its surface, either fall above or 
below the threshold. Because the suspect understood the 
appropriate language requirements, there would be no question as 
to what was meant by what was said; rather, if the instructions to 
invoking the right were followed, then the rights would apply. 
Likely, any question raised regarding whether the right had been 
invoked could be answered in summary judgement. 
This would seem to be an extreme solution if the goal of 
custodial interrogation is to get a confession; however, if the goal  
is not simply to provoke a confession but to do so within the 
confines of the constitutional rights granted to the suspect, then  
the measure protects not only the suspect but the investigators  
as well. In addition to ensuring that the investigators do not  
violate constitutional rights in their investigation methods, the 
solution would also ensure that any confession received by the 
investigators would be acceptable for use before a subsequent 
 
 315. The idea that the threshold might not be properly conveyed or understood has 
some merit but is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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tribunal without question as to whether it ought to be suppressed 
as inadmissible evidence.  
An interrogator could inform a suspect that only explicit direct 
language—such as “I am invoking my right to counsel”—will be 
sufficient to invoke the right, or that any mention of an attorney 
will result in a termination of the interrogation. An interrogator 
could tell the suspect that the suspect must verbally and in 
signature agree to the waiver of rights before the interrogation will 
continue, or that any cooperation in answering questions will serve 
as a waiver of the rights. An interrogator could do something 
different than is mentioned here. The exact standard is not so 
important as the fact that the custodian has explained the required 
threshold so that the lay speaker understands what type of 
language or behavior is required to invoke or waive the right. Of 
course, the interrogator will also be under the obligation to respect 
the invocation of those rights when the designated linguistic 
threshold has been met.  
While the interrogators do not need to guide the suspect 
through every step of avoiding the interrogation, the linguistic 
disparity must be reduced such that the suspect can, through their 
speech, interact within a shared legal-language culture. This will 
level the linguistic playing field from which both parties are 
operating, it will inform the suspect how to be a viable player in the 
legal-language arena, and it will reduce the impacts of power 
asymmetry and politeness mannerisms because the interrogators 
will have effectively communicated that such considerations are 
linguistically irrelevant and potentially fatal when the suspect 
attempts to assert a right. 
This will help the suspect understand that reliance upon 
societal norms for indirectness in communication is not effective 
and that with this new environment comes a different threshold for 
clear communication. The instruction will have explained what 
threshold for clarity and directness is acceptable as an invocation of 
rights and will essentially allow an interrogation suspect to 
requisitely translate their lay-language phrases into approved legal 
speech, should they choose to do so. If people are not linguistically 
capable of invoking the rights in the first place, trying to protect 
constitutional rights with Miranda procedures will continue to  
be ineffective. 
As has been shown, this type of solution would satisfy the 
multiplicity of players involved in this discussion. The solution 
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would fit in with linguistic scholarship regarding cross-cultural 
pragmatic communication and speech act theory. It would follow 
the pattern established by the Supreme Court and other 
governmental branches in creating procedural barriers in the form 
of prophylactic rights, statutes, or regulations as a way to buttress 
the protection of important constitutional rights. And it would 
cater to both lay-language ideology, in that it would prevent 
reliance on indirect forms of speech, and to legal-language ideology 
by supporting the law’s desire to hold firmly to definitive language 
and avoid the interpretation of intent. Surely, if there is a clear 
language standard expressed between the parties involved in the 
exchange, then the courts will be relieved of their duty to review 
context and conversation in order to interpret intent. Rather, the 
threshold for invoking and waiving the rights will have been 
explained and either have been attained or waived.316 This solution 
would increase the law’s justification in presuming the directness 
and affirmative nature of language, while respecting the existence 
of language ideologies less precise or exacting than itself, thus 
reconciling the gap between lay language and legal language so as 
to reduce cross-cultural pragmatic failure.317 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court instituted the Miranda warnings as  
a prophylactic protection of criminal suspects’ constitutional  
rights: the Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and against  
self-incrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process of law. But because the legal speech standard for invoking 
these rights requires an exacting amount of directness, most  
lay speakers are incapable of availing themselves of these rights. 
The language ideology of the law requires directness and  
surface-level meaning. The language ideology of society at large  
is often anchored in indirectness and, subsurface, underlying 
indications of communicative intent that are not supplied on  
 
 316. In this regard the statement in Davis that “a statement either is such an assertion 
of the right to counsel or it is not” will actually be true, because regardless of what standard 
is set within a particular interrogation, the standard will be clear and whether it was met  
will be seen because the language used will be readily comparable to that preestablished 
standard. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (internal quotes and  
citations omitted). 
 317. Further, this would satisfy concerns of linguists, legal scholars, judges, suspects, 
subpoena-riddled interrogators, other interrogators, and defense attorneys. 
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the face of an utterance. This disparity between the language 
expectations of the law and lay society often results in  
cross-cultural pragmatic failure in which laypersons attempt to 
enact legally efficacious speech without success because the law 
relies on the surface meaning of their statements while ignoring the 
underlying communicative intent.  
This disparity is particularly well illustrated in the domain of 
custodial interrogation where lay suspects often implement what 
linguistic scholarship has termed indirect speech acts in order to 
invoke the Miranda rights promulgated by the Supreme Court as 
prophylactic protections of constitutional rights. Because indirect 
speech acts contain their primary function beneath the surface 
meaning of the phrase, these attempts to invoke the Miranda  
rights are often infelicitous because the law does not intuit the  
intended communicative content underlying the utterance but only 
gives credence to the surface meaning of the phrase. This means  
that suspects’ attempts to invoke their rights, when phrased  
indirectly as questions or softened with qualifiers (such as “I think”  
or “maybe”), often fail. Courts erroneously interpret these as  
a theoretic inquisition regarding the availability of a lawyer or  
an ambiguous reference to a potential feeling that it might  
be good to have a lawyer. Linguistic theory, on the other hand,  
recognizes these as efficacious rights invocations couched in 
socially acceptable, albeit indirect, intent communication forms.318 
The disparity between lay language and legal language must be 
reconciled to avoid the continued cross-cultural pragmatic failure 
which so often occurs. While an unequivocal recognition that 
indirect speech acts exist may not be the most reasonable solution 
for a law that generally avoids the interpretation of subjective 
contexts, this gap could be bridged by providing pragmatic 
language education to interrogation suspects regarding the 
required threshold for invoking or waving relevant rights. This 
explanation need not be an aid to help the suspect through the 
entire process of interrogation, but it should be just enough to make 
 
 318. As shown, linguistic theory requires an investigation into the context of the speech 
and a reliance on presumed conversational mannerisms. If this Note were arguing for the 
law to accept this theory and begin investigating the true meaning of these statements, then 
it would be prudent to propose some means of objectively interpreting subjective contexts 
(which provides the linguist’s interpretation of these statements). However, because this 
Note is only arguing that the law set expectations regarding language use, thereby 
eliminating the need to interpret the subjective context in these statements, such a proposal 
is beyond the scope of this Note. See supra Part I. 
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the linguistic expectations clear, make the Miranda rights effectively 
accessible, and level the linguistic playing field. In this way, the law 
can prevent the injustice that so often results when, in high stakes 
situations, individuals rely to their detriment on legally 
unacceptable conversational norms allowing indirectness.  
The potential applications of indirect speech act theory to law 
are many, including statutory interpretation, investigation of 
informed consent in a medical setting, investigation of consent to 
sexual encounters, and contract law, but this Note has attempted to 
appropriately treat only one—indirect speech during custodial 
interrogation. Because, after all, if an Oxford don, operating under 
the most common assumptions about conversational English, is not 
capable of efficaciously invoking the Miranda rights,319 then who is? 
  
 
 319. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 19. 
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